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 The Effect of Capital Requirement Regulation on the Transmission of 












  This paper analyzes the role of bank capitalization on the transmission of 
monetary policy, using a quarterly dataset for Austrian banks spanning from 1997 to 
2003. A substantial understanding of the transmission mechanism in different countries 
of the euro zone is not only of academic interest, but also an important prerequisite for 
central bankers to effectively accomplish their monetary policy goals. While we do find 
evidence in favor of the bank lending channel, with an important role active for 
capitalization, we are unable to confirm whether the bank capital channel is in force in 
Austria. Our results indicate some counter-cyclicality in lending activity, a finding that is 
in line with the existing Austrian literature. 
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Traditionally, theory relating to the monetary policy transmission process - the set 
of links through which monetary policy affects the economy - has largely ignored the role 
of bank equity, focusing rather on the financial conditions of firms and households. While 
the role of banks in this process has gained a lot of attention in recent decades, an 
outstanding and relevant issue that has largely been ignored is the role of capital 
requirement regulation, as defined by the Basel Accord. 
The importance of considering capital requirement regulation is guided by the 
hypothesis that rigid minimum capital ratios act to amplify macroeconomic fluctuations 
in a non-Modigliani-Miller world. The complex relationship between capital requirement 
regulation, bank lending and monetary policy transmission, therefore originates from the 
premise that if a bank’s access to capital is limited, the required capital-loans regulation 
becomes binding, then the amount of capital affects the volume of lending. 
This paper tries to fill a gap in the empirical literature by considering how capital 
requirement regulation can affect lending decisions and consequently the transmission of 
monetary policy from the central bank to the economy. Despite the creation of the unified 
market in 1999, we concentrate our analysis on a single member state, Austria, for a 
number of reasons. Several large institutional differences exist in the banking and 
financial structures of the member states making up the European Union (EU) hindering 
the ability to successfully analyze the EU as an entity. If these differences in the reaction 
to monetary policy shocks between regions in the EU are relevant, then the design of the 
ECB deliberations might well take into account regional considerations. We concentrate 
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 on Austria, as due to the pegging of the Austrian Schilling to the German Mark from 
1981 onwards, the monetary policy stance originating in Germany was largely reflected 
in Austrian interest rates. For this reason, the shift in the conduct of monetary policy from 
the Oesterreichische National Bank (OeNB), to the European Central Bank (ECB) in 
1999, did not result in a break in the data as it would have for other countries (Farinha 
and Marques, 2001). Coupled with its hugely complex banking structure, Austria for this 
reason represents an interesting case study in the analysis of the existence of the bank 
lending and bank capital channels within the EU. Furthermore, research concerning the 
bank capital channel as an additional transmission mechanism of monetary policy has not 
yet been performed for Austria. The role of regulatory capital has not been analyzed 
either. 
We focus on the transmission of monetary policy, namely the reaction of bank 
lending due to a change in the interest rate, and test whether there are differences in 
banks’ lending behavior depending on the degree of capitalization. Furthermore, we 
apply a proxy for maturity transformation costs and employ a new data set including 
quarterly bank level statistics for Austrian banks, spanning from January 1997 to 
December 2003. In addition, we experiment with an alternative measure for the monetary 
policy indicator, thus inspecting the accuracy of the information contained in the typically 
adopted Vienna Interbank Offered Rate (VIBOR). In order to examine both the bank 
capital and the bank lending channels we use a dynamic panel framework giving us an 
insight into the heterogeneity of the Austrian banking system. The GMM estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is applied thereafter. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we explain why it 
is imperative to have a substantial knowledge about regional transmission processes in 
the European Monetary Union. In section 3 we describe the role that banks play in the 
transmission of monetary policy. In section 4 some stylized facts of the Austrian banking 
system and its regulation are presented. Section 5 contains a description of the data used 
for the econometric study. Our model is explained in section 6 and the results are 
presented and discussed in section 7. Alternative specifications to test for robustness are 
shown in section 8. Section 9 shortly concludes. 
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 2. The importance of the regional transmission processes 
 
Since 1999, monetary policy within the euro zone has been in the hands of the 
European Central Bank, whose primary objective is to maintain price stability. Further to 
this purpose, the ECB additionally supports the objectives of a “high level of 
employment” and a “sustainable and non-inflationary growth”.
3 Consequently, for the 
implementation of these targets in an enlarging economy, it is vital to have an 
understanding of the transmission process of monetary policy and the real effects thereof. 
 Since structural differences between members of the euro zone countries are not 
negligible, there are many factors that can have potentially significant effects on 
monetary transmission. Differences in competition policies and market structures, the 
importance of manufacturing to an economy, the role of the national governments in 
economic activities, and – last but certainly not least – the size, structure, and significance 
of the banking sector, which is of particular importance to this paper, all serve as key 
examples. For our analysis concerning the role of banks’ capital, differences extend 
further to include the date and the degree of implementation of the capital requirement 
regulations as imposed by the individual national regulatory authorities, a vital 
component contributing to the analysis of the bank lending and bank capital channels. 
Due to the relative newness of the euro zone as a unified entity, capital market 
integration across borders in Europe is far less advanced than in it is in the US. 
Disparities in the way that monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy are 
                                            
3 See statement of the objectives at the ECB web site. 
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 consequently expected to be far greater, and thus the issue of regional monetary 
transmission is of more relevance in the euro zone than in it the US.
4
Considering the United States, Van den Heuvel (2002a) recently found evidence 
of output growth being more sensitive to changes in different monetary policy indicators 
when a state’s banking sector starts out with a low capital-asset ratio. For his study, Van 
den Heuvel only made use of state level, rather than bank level data, therefore identifying 
the possible need for further research on a more disaggregated level. His findings are 
however both interesting and relevant as they seem to indicate that banks’ capitalization 
may play a very important role for monetary transmission in Europe too. 
                                            
4 The Federal Reserve Boards presumably holds the view that monetary policy should not be used to affect 
particular regions or states (Owyang, and Wall, 2004). Nevertheless, the issue of regional effects of 
monetary policy has also been analyzed for the US, going back to Young (1929). For more recent studies 
see e.g. Di Giacinto (2003) and Owyang, and Wall (2004). 
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 3. The role of banks in monetary transmission 
 
Bank capital regulation and the macro economy 
According to Mishkin (2000) the main instruments of banking regulation can be 
organized into several broad categories namely the government safety net, restrictions on 
bank asset holdings, capital requirements, chartering and bank examination, disclosure 
requirements, consumer protection and restrictions of competition.
5 Such instruments are 
commonly adopted as measures for preventing systemic risk, ensuring that banks and 
investment firms are able to respond quickly to market change, allowing them to operate 
flexibly, while simultaneously safeguarding consistency within the international banking 
sector. 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord and its subsequent amendments address the 
capital requirement aspect of the above-mentioned instruments. The Accord requires 
banks to hold an amount of capital specified as a percentage of their risk-weighted assets. 
The requisite capital is to lie above a certain threshold defined as a function of two types 
of risk (credit risk and market risk). Such capital acts as a “buffer” for possible future 
losses effectively regulating the safety and soundness of each single institution in an 
attempt to create a banking system generally less prone to risks and crises. The objective 
behind the 8%-capital requirements is therefore purely micro-economic: A high level of 
equity capital is designed to overcome the asymmetric information problems implied by 
an entirely deposit financed banking system. Depositors are always paid out their 
holdings on a first come first served basis, thus reducing their incentive to properly 
                                            
5 A similar system of classification is adopted by other sources including among others Freixas and Rochet 
(1997) and Greenbaum and Thakor (1995). 
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 monitor bank management. The combination of the illiquid nature of banks’ assets 
coupled with the risk of not being paid out under the first come first serve basis; together 
create an incentive for depositors to run during cases of perceived or real problems that a 
bank may face. Equity capital holders however, do not have an incentive to run as they 
will always be served last; rather they have a strong incentive to monitor bank 
management in its loan policy ex ante (see Diamond and Rajan (2000) for a slightly 
different explanation). A “high” level of bank equity capital is therefore supposed to 
enhance monitoring and reduce the risk exposure of the individual bank. Furthermore, 
high levels of equity at the individual bank level will also tend to reduce the likelihood of 
system-wide runs. Since runs on the banking system as a whole have a strong contagion 
component, a high degree of capital at the level of the individual bank will increase the 
stability of the entire industry.  
Over the last years economists have conducted a large amount of research on 
further implications of such capital requirements. One strand of literature focuses on the 
risk aversion and risk-taking characteristics of banks under capital regulation (see e.g. 
Kim and Santomero, 1988; Flannery, 1989). An alternative approach highlights the effect 
of the levels of capital holdings on loan growth (Diamond and Rajan, 2000 and 2001). 
This literature states that there is a trade-off between capitalization and lending. Hahn 
(2002) finds evidence in favor of this approach for Austria within the framework of a 
static panel model with annual bank level data for 1996-2000. In this paper we will focus 
on a third topic, the reaction of bank lending to macroeconomic shocks, especially 
monetary shocks, while operating under rigid capital requirements. The question we 
address is the following: If the regulatory capital-asset ratio is affected by a shock, how 
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 will banks react in order to adjust this ratio? Will bank management adjust on the asset 
side (the denominator), i.e. change the loan supply, or will it rather change the liability 
side (the numerator), i.e. the holding of capital? Several authors (e.g. Kishan and Opiela, 
2000; Van den Heuvel, 2002a, 2002b, 2003) have pointed out that it will be a change in 
the loan supply due to an imperfect market for bank equity thereby having an effect on 
economic activity.
6 The exact line of reasoning will be elaborated in the following sub-
section. 
 
Bank capital and bank lending 
Information asymmetries and the costly enforcement of contracts generate agency 
problems within the financial markets. Agency costs are, according to Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995), reflected in the external finance premium, which is the primary cause for 
the existence of a credit channel of monetary transmission. The credit channel works 
through three separate channels namely the balance sheet channel, the bank lending 
channel and the bank capital channel. The balance sheet channel stresses the impact of 
monetary policy on borrowers’ financial position (net worth, cash flow and liquid assets), 
on the size of the external finance premium and consequently on investment spending. 
The bank lending channel stresses however, that monetary policy may affect the supply 
of intermediated credit, bank loans in particular, and is active through an imperfect 
market for bank debt (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Stein, 1998). Empirically both links have 
been investigated extensively with the use of both macro- and microeconomic data. For 
Austria an interest rate puzzle seems to exist. A positive change in monetary policy, 
                                            
6 An additional condition for an effect on real activity is the existence of bank dependent borrowers who are 
not able to perfectly substitute other forms of external finance for bank loans. 
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 signaled to the economy via a change in the interest rate, documents an accommodative 
lending behavior of banks  (Kaufmann, 2001; Braumann, 2004).
7 Kaufmann (2001) 
argues that the puzzle may be due to timing asymmetries. The most recent study 
(Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann, 2005) concludes that traditional bank 
characteristics, such as the size or the liquidity, cannot be used to reveal asymmetric 
lending reactions. They use Bayesian simulation methods instead and find that the bank 
lending channel is quite weak. 
 Recent literature has examined the role of the bank lending channel of monetary 
policy in the presence of capital requirement regulation. The imperfection in the market 
for bank debt consists essentially of information asymmetries relating to the quality of the 
banks´ loan portfolios. This imperfection may be reinforced by an additional imperfection 
in the market for bank equity: Capital serves as a buffer for loan losses. Therefore, high 
capitalization may indicate lower risk for investors in uninsured bank debt if the market 
for bank equity is imperfect, i.e. if a bank cannot raise new capital frictionlessly. Thus the 
external finance premium decreases with the degree of capitalization and consequently, 
better capitalized banks may on average find it easier than low capitalized banks to 
finance their lending business. This property also becomes important in the case of a 
monetary tightening by the central bank. Reserves are reduced and banks have to 
substitute their insured deposits with other more senior forms of debt. Banks with a low 
degree of capitalization, and thus a high external finance premium, will find it harder to 
finance their activities issuing debt and are hence more likely to be forced to reduce 
                                            
7 An accommodative lending behavior means that the estimated coefficient for the interest rate shows a 
positive sign, which indicates that banks increase lending when the interest rate rises, i.e. when a tighter 
monetary policy takes place. To prevent confusion it has to be mentioned that these results were generated 
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 lending after increases in interest rates. Kishan and Opiela (2000) find evidence for 
differential lending reactions after changes in interest rates for differently capitalized 
banks in the US, although only among small banks. 
One potentially problematic aspect of capital requirement regulation as put 
forward by Borio et al., 2001 refers to the potentially pro-cyclical nature that they might 
inject into bank lending. These authors argue that when economic conditions are 
depressed, and collateral values are low, even borrowers with profitable projects can find 
it difficult to obtain funding. When conditions improve, confidence may be high and risks 
evaluated low. Collateral values consequently rise and these firms are again able to obtain 
access to external finance, adding to the economic stimulus thus resulting in a strong pro-
cyclical effect on bank lending activity. As a result the capital constraint may be far from 
binding and lending consequently strong, potentially in an exuberant manner. It is 
generally reasoned that such pro-cyclicality has its roots in information asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders. Borio et al., 2001 however, believe that while this 
financial acceleration surely plays a part in financial cyclicality, it is not the sole reason 
for the somewhat large swings in economic activity occasionally observed. Rather, they 
argue that these swings are additionally caused by inappropriate responses of financial 
market participants to changes in risk over time. These inappropriate responses caused by 
a combination of difficulties in measuring the time dimension of risk, together with the 
incentive that market participants have to react to risk.  
The  bank capital channel implies a more continuous relationship between 
capitalization and lending than the bank lending channel does as it considers the dynamic 
                                                                                                                                  
in a panel framework. Hence, all banks are weighted equally. Thus an inference from bank level data on a 
aggregated level is not necessarily possible. 
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 effects of bank capital due to changes in the stance of monetary policy. The logic is such 
that banks are exposed to interest rate risk whenever the interest sensitivity of their assets 
does not match the sensitivity of their liabilities, or off-balance sheet positions. For a 
bank whose liabilities re-price faster than its assets, a rise in interest rates can reduce net 
interest income by increasing the institution’s cost of funds relative to its yield on assets 
and vice versa. Hence, a monetary tightening will reduce bank profits, which are, if 
retained, part of the regulatory capital. If, as in the case discussed above, the market for 
bank capital is imperfect and if capitalization is low enough (i.e. close to the minimum), 
then the bank will have to reduce lending in order to avoid a fall of capital under the 
minimum regulatory level (Van den Heuvel, 2003a, 2003b).  
Three preconditions are therefore necessary for the bank capital channel to be 
operative: an imperfect market for bank equity, a maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities exposing banks to interest rate risks as well as the existence of minimum capital 
requirements. Van den Heuvel (2002a) presents indirect evidence for the bank lending 
channel for the US by regressing state level output on capital to assets ratios. Gambacorta 
and Mistrulli (2004) model lending directly by a measure of capital in excess of the 
regulatory minimum and thereby present evidence for the bank capital channel in Italy. 
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 4. The structure of the Austrian banking system 
 
The Austrian banking system is a universal banking system whereby no statutory 
requirement to separate commercial banking activities from investment banking activities 
exists. The system is organized by “sectors” where the 897 independent banks
8 
(December 2002) are divided into seven categories: joint stock banks (59), savings banks 
(64), state mortgage banks (9), Raiffeisenbanken (609), Volksbanken (70), special 
purpose banks (81) and housing construction savings and loan associations (5). Each 
sector has its own association to represent its interests. The classification of banks by 
sector is determined by their legal form or by the industry association to which they 
belong. 
The sectors are organized in “single-tier” and “multi-tier” structures. State 
mortgage banks, joint stock banks, housing construction savings and loan associations, 
along with specialized credit institutions are organized under the “single-tier” system. 
Savings banks and Volksbanken are organized under the “two-tier” system with Erste 
Bank and the Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG serving as the central institutions 
respectively. Most savings banks are owned either by a municipality or by a foundation. 
Publicly owned savings banks are backed by a public guarantee which is underpinned and 
superseded by a mutual assistance obligation. Raiffeisenbanken are characterized by a 
“three-tier” system with Raiffeisen Zentralbank and 8 Raiffeisenlandesbanken as central 
and regional institutions respectively. Credit co-operatives (Volksbanken and 
Raiffeisenbanken) include mostly very small banks where depositors are the shareholders. 
                                            
8 Including special purpose banks established for special financing purposes, such banks do not have full 
banking licenses. 
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 A mutual assistance obligation similar to that of the savings banks’ sector links the 
Raiffeisenbanken with the Volksbanken. 
 


























Within the “multi-tier” sectors, the central or head institution assumes the task of 
coordination, including sectoral funding. Moreover, the head institution serves as a 
central hub for business done with other sectors. Members of the “two-tier” and “three-
tier” structure co-operate closely alleviating insolvency problems and preventing 
difficulties that could otherwise affect small banks. A particularly strong awareness of 
belonging together exists between the credit co-operatives and savings banks. Together 
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 they form more than 90% of the entire industry. The sectoral organization of the banking 
industry has historical roots and while there is little difference in the activities of the 
different sectors, the structure remains in place. Such a network structure has important 
consequences for our analysis, as commonly intra-network liquidity management is made 
possible by large head institutions leading to possible affects on the reaction of member 
banks to a shift in monetary policy. Ehrmann and Worms (2004) analyze the reaction of 
inter-bank lending to a monetary policy shock and argue that the existence of bank 
networks are indeed important for a banks’ reaction to monetary policy. They find 
evidence that smaller banks are able to access the inter-bank market through the head 
institution of their network organization. They demonstrate that the reactions of banks 
forming part of a network are not solely dependent on bank specific characteristics, but 
that rather they depend on the position of the network in the inter-bank market. 
 
Table 1: Banking Systems Overview 
 
Austria Belgium Finland Germany Netherlands UK USA
Number of banks per 
100,000 people
11.9 1.2 0.2 3.9 5.1 0.8 3.9
% of deposits accounted 
for by 5 largest banks
38 74 97 12 88 n.a. 21
% of total bank assets 
government owned
4 n . a 2 2 4 2 600
% of total bank assets  
foreign owned
5 n.a 8 4 n.a n.a. 5
Overall bank activities & 
ownership restrictiveness
1.3 2.3 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.3 3
Professional supervisors 
per bank
1 0.7 0.1 1 n.a 0.7 0.1
Does an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme exist?
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% of 10 largest banks rated 
by int’l agencies 80 50 100 100 30 100 100
Source: Barth, Capiro and Levine (2001) 
Due to the large number of independent banks and branch offices that exist 
(5,453), Austria has for many years been considered as being over-banked, with as many  
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 as 11.9 banks existing per 100,000 people a large proportion when compared to just 3.9 
in Germany or the US (see Table 1). In analyzing the bank structure of Austria, it is 
evident that while the number of banks is extremely high, the degree of concentration
9 is 
relatively low largely due to the high number of credit institutions in existence. Austria is 
therefore characterized by a banking system with many very small banks, a large 
proportion of which can be attributed to its network structure. 
 
Bank supervision and regulation 
Compared to other countries, Austria enjoys a high standard of financial 
supervision, based on strong institutions and a modern legal framework. A new integrated 
supervisory regime took effect in April 2002, under which the Financial Market 
Authority performs the banking, securities, insurance, and pension fund supervision and 
ensures the adherence of the banking sector to EU banking laws. With the dominant role 
that banks play in the Austrian financial sector, supervision holds an important function 
in ensuring the ability of the banking system to absorb risks, which is crucial for its 
stability. 
In Austria, the capital requirements for credit risk and market risk were introduced 
in 1993 and 2001 respectively. In terms of credit risk, the Austrian Banking Act requires 
banks to hold capital of at least 8% of the total amount of risk-weighted assets.
10 Assets  
are assigned risk weights according to their assumed rate of credit risk. (0% for items 
with low credit risk, 20% for items with below average credit risk, 50% for items with 
                                            
9 The percentage of deposits accounted for by the five largest banks. 
10 The figure may be increased to 8.5% if it appears to be in the national economic interest in a functioning 
banking system. 
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 medium credit risk, 100% for items with high credit risk).
11 Capital requirements for 
market risks aim to reduce the risk of losses in both on and off-balance sheet positions 
arising from movements in market prices. The requirements are therefore relevant for 
interest rate related instruments, as well as equities, foreign exchange and commodities in 
the trading book. The risk is broken down into “specific risk”
12 pertaining to each 
individual security and “general risk”
13 for the combined portfolio, where short and long 
positions in different securities and instruments can be offset. The total capital ratio is 
calculated by adding the sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risks to a measure of 
market risk multiplied by 12.5 (the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8%). 
14
 
                                            
11 Interested readers should consult Chapter V “The Austrian Banking Act and The Austrian Financial 
Market Authority Act” (OeNB 2002a) for further classification of how asset weights are assigned.  
12 Specific risk relates to losses that can be determined by market price fluctuations, which are specific to 
the economic conditions of the issuer. 
13 General risk relates to asset price fluctuations correlated to market developments. 
14 In the calculation of capital requirements for credit and market risk a numerical link should be created by 
multiplying the measure of 12.5 (the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8%). 
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 5. The data 
 
To estimate the model employed in our analysis, we use a sample that includes 
quarterly balance sheet data from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2003. 
The data was obtained from the Oesterreichische National Bank (OeNB), which collects 
the statistics from all Austrian banks. Effectively, the estimations of the dependent 
variable started in 1998 as regulatory capital and maturity classes were only available 
from this time. Thus, data preceding 1998 was used only in order to obtain lagged values 
of some of the variables. 
Only banks that were in business at the end of 2003 were included in our dataset. 
The original sample consequently includes 894 banks. In a first step towards cleaning the 
data, specialized banks were identified by their banking code and were subsequently 
deleted from the sample. In most cases these are banks owned by car producers whose 
loans are heavily dependent on new car models, or then foreign banks with branches in 
Austria. Many banks in these two groups show a highly volatile loan series. In 
considering mergers, we assigned a dummy variable for the buying bank in the quarter 
when the merger took place. Since we use the differences of logs for claims on customers 
as our proxy for loan growth, we detected further outliers by looking for jumps larger 
than 50 or smaller than -50 percent. If a bank showed more than one jump of this kind, it 
was omitted from the sample. Quite often this was a good way to identify some more 
specialized banks which were not deleted before as they did not bear an according 
banking code. If only one jump was identified, which was not explicable by a reported 
merger, another dummy variable was added. This was the case for seven banks. 
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 To keep as much information as possible and in contrast to existing work done 
with Austrian bank level data (see Kaufmann, 2001; Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann, 
2005), we use an unbalanced panel, additionally including all banks that were founded 
during the sample period and that still existed at the end. After the cleaning process was 
completed, 760 banks were left in our dataset. They cover almost 90% of the total loans 
and total assets of the initial sample. 
 
Table 2: The Structure of the Banking Sector (sample after cleaning) 
EUR million % share in 
aggregate 
total assets





Sparkassen (Savings banks) 115,750 22 55,260 20 64
Erste Bank (central inst.) 61,802 20,753 1
Volksbanken  (industrial credit cooperatives) 33,624 6 17,253 6 68
Oesterreichische Volksbank AG 12,742 4,309 1
State mortgage banks 45,750 9 28,304 10 8
Commercial banks* 178,762 33 96,977 36 24
Raiffeisenkassen (agricultural credit cooperatives) 149,583 28 67,635 25 595
Raiffeisenzentralbank (head institute) 37,836 10,512 1
Raiffeisenlandesbanken 45,413 18,104 8
Other banks** 13,884 3 6,708 2 1
Total 537,352 272,136 760
Total assets of banking sector 605,106
Percentage in sample 89
Total Assets Dec. 2003
Total Loans to non-
financial institutions Dec. 
2003
* Note: BA-CA, Austria’s largest bank (105.659 millions of assets) is included in the group of commercial banks even though it is 
often shown in Sparkassen. 
**We only included Postsparkasse and excluded all other specialized banks from our sample. 
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 6. The model 
 
To test for the existence of the bank lending and bank capital channels under 
different degrees of capitalization in Austria, we employ an empirical model that is 
related to the work of the “eurosystem monetary transmission network”.
15 The motivation 
for adopting this framework is to provide some consistency among existing papers,
16 as 
well as some comparability to the most recent studies from other euro area member 
countries
17  as well as previous studies for Austria.
18  
We estimate the following equations through the use of instrumental variable 
estimators for panels developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). For consistent estimates, 
the test of over-identification can not be rejected and therefore autocorrelation of order 
two or higher should not exist. In all of the following results, the tests indicated that there 
is no autocorrelation of higher order. As this is a common finding within the existing 
literature, we only show the results for the autocorrelation test of first and second order. 
Furthermore, we estimate heteroscedasticity robust variance-covariance matrices. In this 
case the Sargan test of over-identification cannot be performed as the distribution is not 
known. In appendix 3 the test of over-identification for the estimations without 
heteroscedasticity robust variance-covariance matrices are shown. It is assumed to be 
                                            
15 The “eurosystem monetary transmission network” is a joint venture between the European Central Bank 
and national central banks which investigated the transmission of monetary policy. See Angeloni / Kashyap 
/ Mojon (2003). 
16 The “eurosystem monetary transmission network” is a joint venture between the European Central Bank 
and national central banks which investigated the transmission of monetary policy. See Angeloni / Kashyap 
/ Mojon (2003). 
17 See e.g. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and the papers of the “eurosystem monetary transmission 
network” (Angeloni et al. (2003)). 
18 See e.g. Kaufmann (2001, 2003). 
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 extremely conservative under the aforementioned circumstances. The estimated equation 
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with i=1,….,N (N=number of banks) and t =1,….,T (t = quarters). 
it L     = loans of bank i in quarter t 
t MP     = monetary policy indicator (in percentage)
 19
t y     = real GDP 
t REER   = real effective exchange rate 
it X     = measure of excess capital 
it ρ   = cost per unit of asset that a bank incurs due to a one per cent 
increase in   t MP
D    = a set of shift dummies that controls for jumps caused by mergers 
SD    = three seasonal dummies 
it Ψ     = ln(assets) as control variable 
 
To obtain loan growth as an endogenous variable, we make use of a series 
containing the banks’ claims to non-financial customers which takes the differences of 
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 the logarithms in two subsequent periods.
20 We have applied the three-month money 
market rate (VIBOR) from 1998
 to 2003 as the indicator for monetary policy.
21 The rate 
is a non-weighted average of daily offered rates for inter-bank deposits of the most 
important banks on the basis of transactions by these banks. The estimated coefficient of 
MP indicates the average-capitalized bank’s reaction to a change in the monetary policy 
indicator. 
The quarter-on-quarter changes of the real effective exchange rate and quarterly 
GDP growth are included to control for loan demand effects. To check for robustness we 
take the real estate index IATX instead of GDP.
22
The importance of the level of capital for bank lending is tested for by the 
inclusion of the normalized variable for excess capital (actual regulatory capital minus 


















where   measures excess capital while   represents total assets of bank i in quarter 
t. A distribution curve for excess capital can be found in chart 2 of appendix 3. By 
it EC it A
                                                                                                                                  
19  One percent and a one percentage point change are scaled to 0.01 for all variables to guarantee 
consistency with the differences of the logarithm. 
20 In this series foreign loans are included and make up 18.7% of the total loans. Using total loans, leads to 
consistency with the maturity transformation costs (see appendix 2). This last figure can only be calculated 
based on domestic and foreign assets and liabilities for data availability reasons. 
21 Over the observation period, the Austrian Shilling was pegged to the German Mark and consequently, the 
German monetary policy, as mirrored by the German interest rate played a relevant role in Austria. We use 
the Austrian interest rate as the correlation between the two rates is extremely high. 
22 Since the results are rather similar to those obtained for GDP, they will not be shown, but are available 
from the authors on request. 
23 The period average was deducted to remove the time trend which was present. 
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 normalizing excess capital, the average-capitalized bank has an   of zero. This will 
simplify the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. 
it X
Notice that we use a measure of excess capital instead of the capital-to-assets 
ratio. There are mainly three reasons for measuring capital in this way. First, the amount 
of capital held in excess of the required minimum may be interpreted as a ‘cushion’ that 
might prevent a fall below the minimum requirement in the future, which would result in 
intervention by the supervisor. The simple capital-to-asset ratio only considers the total 
amount of capital effectively held by a bank which is composed by two items: regulatory 
capital plus excess capital. It is important to note that regulatory capital cannot be used as 
a cushion in the face of changing economic conditions, e.g. changes in monetary policy 
rate. Excess capital only serves as buffer that can be used to expand (or at least no 
reduce) lending above the maximum determined by regulatory capital.
24 Therefore, our 
measure of excess capital more accurately reflects the extent to which a bank is well 
capitalized, as it considers the individual bank’s capacity expand lending when restrictive 
monetary policy takes place. Second, the employed measure implicitly accounts for risk 
as defined by the Basel I Accord. Finally, by normalizing by the average capitalization of 
all banks for the entire sample, the positive and negative deviations from the average 
allow for opposite reactions by banks that are low capitalized (below average) and high 
capitalized (above average). 
The coefficient    captures the influence that the level of a bank´s excess  λ
                                            
24 For a short review of the buffer theory and literature references see e.g. Heid, Porath, and Stolz (2003). 
Note also the analogy of excess capital and excess reserves, the later of which serving as a buffer against 
unexpected cash losses.  
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 capitalization has on its average loan growth. A negative and significant value would 
support the theory of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001). It was shown by Hahn (2002)
25 
that for Austria, increasing levels of capital held by banks are traded off by a reduction in 
lending. 
The interaction terms  ,  , and 
 are used to control for endogeneity. Furthermore, they serve to test for 
asymmetric reactions across banks to macroeconomic shocks due to their degree of 
capitalization. As the average-capitalized bank has a capitalization of 0, its reaction to 
changes in the interest rate, REER, and GDP is reflected in the estimated coefficients for 
these macro-variables. With the above interaction terms, we can see whether low and 
























j t it j y X τ
26 are significant, then there is an asymmetric reaction. In addition, a 
positive and significant sign for the total effect of   (for j = 1 to 3) would 
mean that banks’ lending reaction to an interest rate change depends on the degree of 
capitalization. This would indicate that low capitalized banks react more restrictively to 
an increase in the monetary policy indicator than well capitalized banks and would thus 








j t it j MP X γ
                                            
25 However, Hahn’s results have to be treated cautiously as the study uses yearly data and thus only 
consists of five points in time. Furthermore, a static estimation is used and not regulatory numbers are taken 
into consideration. 
26 In the calculation of the total effect of monetary policy (generally called long-term coefficient in the 
literature), the dynamic structure of the model has to be taken into account. The coefficient for the 
monetary policy indicator is calculated as follows:  . Other total effects are calculated 









j j α β
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 The existence of the bank capital channel is based on a maturity mismatch 
resulting in transformation costs incurred by changes in the stance of monetary policy. 
The calculation of such a maturity transformation therefore facilitates the calculation of 
the overall potential cost bank i faces due to its interest rate exposure. 
 
∑





i i i i
i A
P A ) ( ζ χ
ρ (3) 
 
The calculation above demonstrates that the cost  i ρ  a bank faces depends on the 
amount of assets  or liabilities  A P  of j months-to-maturity as well as on the sensitivity of 
assets  j χ  or liabilities  j ζ  to a one-per-cent increase in the interest rate.
27 A justification 
of the calculation of  i ρ is expanded in appendix 2. For each bank and for each time 
period, a bank specific variable  i ρ  has been calculated. The variable  i ρ  assumes positive 
values for costs (per unit of assets) after an increase of the monetary policy indicator by 
one percentage point.  i ρ  has then been multiplied by the absolute change in the interest 
rate in order to obtain a proxy for the maturity transformation costs for each bank in each 
period. Differences are then taken to estimate the reaction of bank lending due to a 
change in maturity transformation costs. In order to verify the existence of a bank capital 
channel in this set-up, the parameter estimate has to be negative; i.e. transformation costs 
have a negative effect on lending. 
                                            
27 If ∑ ) ( j j j j P A ⋅ − ⋅ ζ χ > 0 then  i ρ represents the cost per unit of asset i that the bank suffers in the 
case of a one percentage point rise in the interest rate. In case of a negative sign there is a profit of maturity 
transformation for an increase of the interest rate. 
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 We used the logarithm of total assets as a variable to control for bank size.
28 
Furthermore, three seasonal dummies are introduced to capture seasonal effects. 
Explanations on the shift dummies for mergers are provided in section 4. 
The critical reader may wonder if we run into an endogeneity bias with our panel 
setting. Theoretically speaking this could be the case if the European Central Bank 
reacted to some situation specific to Austria and thus the interest rate would not be 
exogenous any more. We think that this is not a practical problem for several reasons. 
First, we use bank level data. From an economic point of view it is extremely unlikely 
that the European Central Bank changes the interest rate setting behavior in reaction to 
the situation of one specific Austrian bank. Hence, the interest rate can be considered as 
exogenous for each Austrian bank. Second, from an econometric point of view we were 
particularly careful in trying to control for endogeneity. As mentioned above we used 
lags of the regressors and interacted them with the macro variables and instrumented 
them with their own lags in the GMM setting. Furthermore, in an additional check of 
robustness, we use the residuals of a Vector Error Correction Model to see how banks 
react to unanticipated changes in the stance of monetary policy. 
 
                                            
28 When using the assets lagged by one period or alternatively, when omitting this variable entirely, the 
estimated coefficients are pretty similar. In some specifications the estimation does however suffer from 
some higher order autocorrelation as a consequence, which may be due to jumps caused by merger activity. 
Thus we chose the above equation that is assumed not to run into a simultaneity bias as the variable is 
instrumented and the alternative specifications deliver similar results.  
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 7. The results 
 
The standard specification indicates that the “average” Austrian bank shows 
almost no reaction to changes in the interest rate in the long run (see Table 3). The 
estimated total effect for MP is slightly negative but not significant. Interestingly, the 
short run coefficients (which are not shown in the table for brevity) show that during the 
period of the interest rate increase, as well as one quarter later, lending decreases by 
between 1% and 1.5%. Two periods following the shift, lending increases by almost the 
same amount. The estimated short term coefficients are all highly significant at the 1% 
level. 
Table 3: Results of the standard specification 







Mat. Trans. Cost 3.79 0.24
Excess Capital -0.04 0.35
A-B-test for autocorrelation in residuals (p-value):
order one: 0.00
order two: 0.39
            (H0: no autocorrelation)










According to the highly significant estimated coefficient for  j γ  (for j = 1 to 3), 
low and high-capitalized banks react in a different way to changes in the interest rate. 
Low-capitalized banks behave more restrictively in cases of an interest rate increase 
while high-capitalized banks react more expansively. To illustrate this: using the 
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 estimated coefficient, a bank that belongs to the group of 10% best capitalized banks 
reduces lending by 0.3% less than the “average” bank. For the low-capitalized bank the 
additional decrease would be 0.1%.
29 The results provide evidence for the existence of a 
bank lending channel in Austria. These results differ somewhat to the existing literature 
for Austria (Kaufmann, 2001, Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann, 2005) which finds 
some evidence for the bank lending channel when using liquidity
30 as a distinguishing 
feature. The asymmetric reaction is however due to the existence of very small banks. 
Thus the effect on the Austrian economy is considered to be rather irrelevant. As shown 
in appendix 3 the 10% lowest capitalized banks in our sample make up about 10% of the 
banking sector’s assets and loans, whereas the highest capitalized banks constitute a 
much smaller portion. As a consequence, the reaction of the low capitalized banks can 
not be neglected as expected effects of the transmission of monetary policy to the real 
economy may exist. 
Lending increases by 1.26% when GDP rises by 1%. This positive relation is in 
line with expectations. Again, there is an asymmetric reaction due to capitalization. Low-
capitalized banks are more “procyclical” than well-capitalized banks. The estimated 
coefficient for REER has to be considered with caution as it is only significant at the 10% 
level, whereas the asymmetric reaction on REER changes show significance at the 5% 
level. 
We do not find evidence for the bank capital channel in the specification as the 
estimated coefficient for the maturity transformation costs is not significant. This could 
                                            
29 These numbers have been calculated as follows: estimated coefficient (4.82) * average capitalization of 
the 10% best capitalized banks (0.064) * one percent interest rate increase (0.01) = 0.0031. 
30 During the sample periods of the aforementioned studies, numbers for regulatory capital were not yet 
available. 
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 be due to the structure of maturity transformation in the Austrian system. Especially 
small banks’ liabilities have a longer maturity structure than their assets. As a result, 
these banks do not suffer from maturity transformation costs in case of a monetary 
tightening. It is possible that this phenomenon could be explained by the network 
structure of Austrian banks. As discussed in section 3, local savings and cooperative 
banks are organized in a one and two tier system respectively. Head institutes can thus 
play an important role in times of a monetary contraction by providing liquidity. Our 
results are in line with the results of Ehrmann and Worms (2004) who examine banks’ 
network structure in Germany (see appendix 3 for further explanations related to this 
issue). Furthermore, most of the Austrian loans are either short term or have flexible 
interest rates. As a consequence in times of monetary tightening Austrian banks can 
adjust the interest rates for medium- and long-term loans, while they have to adjust the 
interest rate for deposits. This means that they do not bear maturity transformation costs. 
Another reason could be the structure of the overall banking system which consists 
mainly of savings banks and credit cooperatives which do not necessarily only maximize 
their profits. 
Finally, the estimated coefficient for excess capital gives no indication that well 
and low-capitalized banks have a differing average loan growth. Thus, Hahn´s (2002) 
result within a different model set-up and a different sample period, could not be 
confirmed.
31
In order to account for the potentially different reaction in lending of certain 
sectors of the Austrian banking industry, we applied the same model setup as in the 
standard regression for the cooperative banks alone (Genossenschaftsbanken). As shown 
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 in Table 4 the signs in this regression, as well as the insignificance of the monetary policy 
variable, are the same as in the standard regression. The difference lies in the significance 
levels (none of the variables are significant at the 1% level). The size of the effects are all 
larger than those for the entire sample. There also remains the discrepancy in reaction for 
different degrees of capitalization, which is significant at the 5% level for GDP and 
REER and at the 10% level for interest rate changes. Maturity transformation and the 
level of capitalization play no role here either. 
 
Table 4: Cooperative Banks (Genossenschaftsbanken) 
 







Mat. Trans. Cost 0.08 0.16
Excess Capital 0.06 0.50
A-B-test for autocorrelation in residuals (p-value):
order one: 0.00
order two: 0.19
            (H0: no autocorrelation)









                                                                                                                                  
31 See footnote 17 for the criticism of his model set-up. 
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 8. Alternative specifications to test for robustness 
 
i) Time Dummies 
In a first robustness check, we examine whether all time effects are captured by 
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where   is a time dummy for each period, which replaces changes in MP, GDP, and 
REER in the standard specification. If the estimated coefficients of the remaining 
variables are similar to those already obtained, then we would have an indication that the 
previous equation has been well specified with regard to the time effect of the panel.  
t TD
 
Table 5: Time Dummies 




Mat. Trans. Cost 4.78 0.18
Excess Capital -0.05 0.38
A-B-test for autocorrelation in residuals (p-value):
order one: 0.00
order two: 0.44
            (H0: no autocorrelation)
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 This robustness check (see Table 5) confirms the choice of the macro-variables. The 
estimated coefficients for the interaction terms as well as the micro-variables and their 
significances are comparable to those in the specification above. 
 
ii) VECM Residuals as alternative indicator for monetary policy 
In a second specification to test for robustness, we identify an alternative measure 
for monetary policy shocks given by the disturbance term of a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM). The logic behind this procedure is to capture the information contained 
by the deviations (the residuals) from the assumed rule followed by the monetary policy, 
(the VECM) to influence main macroeconomic variables. In other words, the residuals of 
the VECM are likely to contain additional information that is not observable in the simple 
interest rate series, namely, the deviations from the systematic part of the monetary 
policy. In this context, the VECM specification is given by: 
    t p t p t t t u Y A Y A Y A Y A + + + + = − − − ... 2 2 1 1 0
(5) 
with  ) , 0 ( ~ u t N iid u Σ
 
The variables included in the vector   are ordered as follows: logarithm of gross 
domestic product, logarithm of consumer price index, monetary policy indicator 
(VIBOR) and the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate.
t Y
32 We then replace the 
monetary policy indicator VIBOR by a vector that contains the residuals of the interest 
                                            
32 See appendix 1 for a detailed description of the VECM model used to identify the monetary policy 
shocks. 
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where   in equation (1) is replaced by  . The results are shown in Table 
6.  
j t MP− j t MPRvecm −
Table 6: VECM Residuals 
  Variable L.T. Coefficient p-value
∆ ResVECM 0.77 0.03**





Mat. Trans. Cost 4.58 0.33
Excess Capital -0.01 0.89
A-B-test for autocorrelation in residuals (p-value):
order one: 0.00
order two: 0.70
            (H0: no autocorrelation)









The total effect of our identified monetary policy shocks is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. This is an interesting finding for two reasons. First, it is in line 
with the evidence found in prior studies and indicates that Austrian banks react by 
expanding lending when the monetary policy is tightened.
33 Long-term bank-customer 
relationships are strongly rooted and important in Austria (“Hausbankprinzip”) and serve 
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 as a possible explanation for the puzzling finding. Kaufmann (2001) finds evidence of 
this counter-cyclical effect during periods of an economic slump. The majority of banks 
in Austria are small cooperatives or savings banks that do not necessarily follow only 
profit maximizing principles. In our sample we have 661 cooperatives and 63 local 
savings banks. The situation may have been amplified due to our data cleaning procedure 
as we omitted several private banks due to their large loan volatility (see section 4). 
Second, it suggests that the real monetary policy indicator could be different from the 
commonly adopted three-month interest rate (VIBOR) and it could therefore be better 
identified by the residuals of a VECM model.
34 The estimated coefficient for REER is 
negative (-0.57) and significant at the 1%. In other words, Austrian banks expand their 
lending following a depreciation,
35 which should not be surprising for a country whose 
exports represent about 49% of GDP. The total effect of the interaction term between 
excess capital and REER is positive and significant at the 5 % level, and is similar in 
magnitude to the coefficient obtained under the standard specification. 
While the coefficient for GDP is negative and not significant, the coefficient of 
the interaction term between GDP and excess capital is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. This last result is somewhat controversial and goes against our findings under other 
specifications. Also, interestingly the coefficient of the interaction term between excess 
capital and   is much larger in magnitude than the stand-alone coefficient for 
and significant at the 5% level. This finding is also consistent with the 
j t MPRvecm −
j t MPRvecm −
                                                                                                                                  
33 See Kaufmann (2001) and Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann (2003). 
34 Since this alternative measure of the monetary policy indicator is given by estimated residual values the 
results presented under this specification must be interpreted carefully. It would be advisable to perform a 
bootstrap procedure in order to investigate the convergence of our results. Due to the limited amount of 
time we had during our research stay at the Austrian National Bank, we were unable to perform such an 
analysis. 
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 evidence presented by Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) for the case of Italy. Finally, the 
coefficients of the maturity transformation cost variable and of excess capital are not 
significantly different from 0, indicating that both the bank capital channel hypothesis 
and the level of capitalization do not play a role in explaining the growth in lending. 
 
c) Real lending 
In a final check of robustness (Table 7), real loan growth and the real interest rate 
are used instead of nominal values. Thus we can compare the reaction in nominal terms 
to that in real terms.  
Table 7: Real Variables 







Mat. Trans. Cost 0.93 0.73
Excess Capital 0.00 0.95
A-B-test for autocorrelation in residuals (p-value):
order one: 0.00
order two: 0.73
            (H0: no autocorrelation)









The average reaction of lending to a change in the stance of monetary policy is positive 
and significant at the 1% percent significance level and thus confirms the results of the 
studies mentioned above. It further confirms the specification with VECM residuals for 
nominal values. In contrast, the insignificant effect in our standard model is again put into 
question. Capitalization causes a differential lending reaction as indicated by the 
                                                                                                                                  
35 REER is defined in a way that increasing values indicate a real appreciation.  
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 significant coefficients of the interaction term. The coefficients for real GDP, and that of 
its interaction with capitalization, are both highly significant and with the expected signs. 
The real effective exchange rate has a significant but unexpected positive sign. The 
coefficients for the change in the maturity transformation costs and the level effect of 
capitalization are, as in all specifications, insignificant. Hence we cannot find evidence 
for either the bank capital channel or an effect of the level of capitalization on lending.  
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 9. Conclusion 
 
Using quarterly balance sheet data from the OeNB covering all Austrian banks, we 
employed an unbalanced panel to test for the existence of a bank lending and a bank 
capital channel, under different degrees of capitalization. 
While we are successful in finding evidence of the bank-lending channel, we are 
unable to confirm the existence of a bank capital channel in Austria. A possible reason 
for our inability to identify the capital channel could be attributed to the fact that until 
only recently the OeNB merely collected five maturity classes for bank assets and 
liabilities instead of the thirteen classes suggested by the amendment of the Basel Accord 
to include market risk (1996). Another potential source of weakness could be the 
structure of maturity transformation in the Austrian system. An irregularity appears to 
exist whereby many Austrian banks show maturity transformation profits rather than 
transformation costs. The important network structure in place within the country, serves 
as a further possible explanation as the existence of networks have a powerful implication 
on the reaction of banks’ to changes in monetary policy. 
Relating to the measure commonly adopted as the indicator for monetary policy 
shocks, we make an interesting finding. When we identify monetary policy shocks by the 
deviation of the rule followed by the central bank, i.e. the systematic part of the monetary 
policy, we observe that the estimated coefficients show both different signs as well as a 
different magnitude. The latter measure for monetary policy shocks has not been used 
frequently in the literature for Austria. Our results indicate that further research in this 
area may be fruitful. 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) and Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) 
have become a standard tool in economics to identify the response of macroeconomic 
variables to monetary policy shocks. Christiano et al. (1996) specify a model that has 
become the standard for the US. For the case of Austria however, it is more difficult to 
find such a “benchmark” model. Here we subsequently use the specification of Ehrmann 
(2000) in order to compare our estimations. All such models relate back to Sims (1980) 
and assume that the economy can be described by the following structural equation: 
 
 
t p t p t t t u Y A Y A Y A Y A + + + + = − − − ... 2 2 1 1 0
(A1.1) 
with  ) , 0 ( ~ u t N iid u Σ
 
where   (with i = 0,1, …, p) is an n × 1 vector of endogenous (macroeconomic) 
variables. This model represents the rule followed by the central bank to influence other 
macroeconomic variables. Since our goal is to identify monetary shocks, our interest lies 
not on the rule itself but rather on deviations from that rule. This allows us to observe the 
response of macroeconomic variables to unexpected monetary shocks. The model has to 
be estimated in its reduced form though, which is given by: 
i t Y −
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 where   is a finite-order lag polynomial matrix. The relationship between the 
structural and the reduced form disturbances is given by.
) (L C
36





The set of macroeconomic variables included in the vector   were ordered as 
follows: logarithm GDP, logarithm of consumer price index (CPI), VIBOR and the 
logarithm of the real effective exchange rate. Since the variable VIBOR does not enter in 
logarithms in the panel regression we do not apply logarithms to the variable VIBOR in 
the VECM regression. This allows us to compare the results of the panel regression when 
we use the VECM residuals as the monetary policy shock indicator. The model is 
estimated by 2SLS, the chosen order of cointegration is 2 and the number of lags of the 
endogenous variables is 4.
t Y
37
                                            
36 For an excellent discussion on models used to identify monetary policy shocks, see Christiano et al. 
(1999). Watson (1994) offers a straightforward presentation of VAR and SVAR systems and the problem 
of their identification. 
37 Ehrmann (2000) also uses a cointegration rank of order 2 to estimate the monetary rule for Austria, 
however, he uses only 2 lags for the endogenous variable. 
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 Appendix 2 
 
In order to calculate  i ρ , the cost a bank faces due to the maturity transformation, 
we employ the following: 
∑





j j j j
i A
P A ) ( ζ χ
ρ  
The sensitivities ( j χ and  j ζ ) are obtained directly from the supervisory 
regulation,
38 which gives banks the liberty to decide whether to opt for the “maturity 
method“ or the “duration method”
39 in its treatment of general market risk for all 
securities forming part of the trading portfolio. Under the “maturity method” assets and 
liabilities are grouped according to maturity bands and risk weights are subsequently 
imposed on the netted out positions. While banks are potentially exposed to interest rate 
risk on all of their interest-rate related assets and liabilities,
40 the regulation deals only 
with the trading portfolio. In order to determine the existence of a bank capital channel 
however, it is necessary to consider the change in the economic value of a bank due to a 
change in the interest rate rather than purely the change in the capital requirement for the 
bank. It is therefore required to take into account total assets and liabilities rather than 
those merely existing in the trading portfolio. The extent to which the economic value of 
a bank is exposed to interest rate changes is dependent on the degree of maturity 
                                            
38 The amendment to the Basel Accord to incorporate Market Risks, Basle Committee January 1996. 
39 With the supervisors consent allows the bank to calculate the price sensitivity of each position separately, 
giving a more accurate measure for overall market risk. 
40 Independent of whether they are held for trading and marked to market or for a longer time horizon and 
carried at book value. 
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 mismatch that the bank is  holding.
41 While several arguments against the 
use of the same methodology for all assets and liabilities irrespective of whether they 
have been marked to market or held at book value have been brought forward, it is 
equally clear that from an economic perspective the effect of a change in interest rates on 
any given financial instrument is the same regardless of whether the instrument is held in 
a trading portfolio or on the banking book (“Measurement of Bank’s Exposure to Interest 
Rate Risk”, Committees at the Bank for International Settlement). We have therefore 
adopted the risk weights for the interest rate risk in market risk proposals as from Table 1 
from the amended Accord.
42 In order to differentiate between the assets that are marked 
to market and those that are carried at book value, the latter have been multiplied not only 
by a risk weight (as those marked to market) but also by a duration weight which adjusts 
the figure in order to reflect the relative volatility of interest rates across the term 
structure. For each bank, for each time period, a bank specific variable has been 
calculated. This figure has then been multiplied by the change in interest rate in order to 
gain an insight into the relative gain or loss per unit of asset in each period. 
i ρ
 
                                            
41 If a bank is funding five-year fixed rate loans with short-term deposits, it is exposed to changes in interest 
rates. But if it funds these loans with deposits having the same maturity and cash-flow characteristics, it is 
not exposed, since any change in the economic value of the loans would be offset by a change in the 
economic value of the deposits. 
42 Amendment to the Capital Accord to include Market Risk, Basel Committee (1996) 
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 Appendix 3 
i) Distribution of excess capital 
 
The distribution of excess capital for the banks in our sample for all time periods can be 
seen in Chart 2 below. 
 


















































































































Source:  OeNB and  own calculations.
 
 
As we use a relative measure of capitalization, the size of differently capitalized banks 
may provide some further insights. The lowest capitalized banks, which make up the 10
th 
percentile of capitalization (-0.03 on average), have 9.0% (10.7%) of the total banking 
sector’s assets (loans) on their books. In contrast, the ‘best’ capitalized banks in the 90th 
percentile (+0.03 on average) make up 2.2% (2.1%) of the total banking sector’s assets 
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 (loans). This means that low-capitalized banks have about the size of the ‘average’ bank, 
whereas high-capitalized banks are disproportionally small. 
 
 
ii) Structure of maturity transformation costs 
 
The distribution of the maturity transformation costs looks as follows: 
 
Table 8: Structure of unweighted rhos in the Austrian banking system 
Overall sector Cooperative Banks Savings Banks State mortgage banks Joint stock banks
Rho -0.20 -0.22 -0.01 0.38 0.44
 
Surprisingly, the unweighted rho of the overall banking sector is negative. This 
means that many banks have maturity transformation profits, which is counter-intuitive as 
performing a maturity transformation, is one of the basic functions of any bank. In the 
sample, there are 17,369 quarterly observations for rho. We observe 9,244 negative rhos 
(maturity transformation profits), while only 8,125 positive rhos (costs). 
At a first glance at the data, it is already evident that cooperative banks show 
maturity transformation profits and that they dominate the unweighted average. As many 
as 595 out of 760 banks belonged to the cooperatives sector in December 2003. 
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By doing this, we obtain an average rho of 0.44 for the total banking sector which 
is coincidentally the same as that for joint stock banks. This is a clear sign that Austrian 
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 banks on average do perform maturity transformation, but that smaller banks in the 
cooperatives’ sector do not. 
Ehrmann and Worms (2004) analyse the importance of bank networks for banks’ 
reaction to changes in monetary policy. They show that for Germany, networks’ head 
institutions accept short-term deposits from member banks in return for longer-term loans 
to those banks. Based on this, when a shift in monetary policy occurs, funds are 
distributed within the network. In the case of a monetary tightening for example, member 
banks are able to make use of liquidity buffers held with their head institution. Such 
activity has powerful implications for monetary policy transmission as it counteracts any 
size-related distributional effects between banks in any country where such networks are 
in existence. 
To test for such a network structure in Austria, we merged the balance sheets of 
the local cooperative banks and savings banks with their respective head institutions (8 
head institutes for cooperative banks on a state level and Erste Bank for the savings 
banks) and calculated rhos for the fictively merged banks. In 2003, only one out of the 
eight merged cooperative head institutes had on average a negative rho. All others, 
including the merged Erste Bank had on average positive rhos in 2003. Bearing in mind 
that the cooperatives sector is organised according to the ‘two-tier’ system, when merging 
the whole sector, we get positive rhos. It is therefore evident that a similar network 
structure exists in Austria as described for Germany by Ehrmann and Worms (2004). 
When we ran panel estimations with the merged head institutions and the rest of 
the banking sector, the estimated coefficients were not significant. This provides an 
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 indication while the network structure plays a very important role; lending decisions are 
largely taken at the local level. 
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